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AbstrAct
Wild animals are vastly more numerous than animals on factory farms, in laboratories, or 
kept as pets. Most of these animals endure intense suffering during their lives, such as from 
disease, hunger, cold, injury, and chronic fear of predators. Many wild animals give birth to 
tens or hundreds of offspring at a time, most of which die young, often in painful ways. This 
suggests that suffering plausibly dominates happiness in nature. Humans are not helpless to 
reduce wild-animal suffering. Indeed, humans already influence ecosystems in substantial 
ways, so the question is often not whether to intervene but how to intervene. Because ecol-
ogy is so complex, we should study carefully how to reduce wild-animal suffering, giving due 
consideration to unintended long-run consequences. We should also promote concern for 
wild animals and challenge environmentalist assumptions among activists, academics, and 
other sympathetic groups. Finally, we should ensure that our descendants think twice before 
spreading ecosystems to areas where they do not yet exist.
Keywords: wild animal suffering, natural harms, population dynamics, predation, 
death, intervention in nature, sentience, ecology, terraforming, unforeseen con-
sequences.
In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or 
imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature’s every day 
performances. […] The phrases which ascribe perfection to the 
course of nature can only be considered as the exaggerations 
of poetic or devotional feeling, not intended to stand the test 
of a sober examination. No one, either religious or irreligious, 
believes that the hurtful agencies of nature, considered as a 
whole, promote good purposes, in any other way than by inciting 
human rational creatures to rise up and struggle against them.
John Stuart Mill (Mill [1874] 2005, 28-32)
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1. intRoduction
Animal activists typically focus their efforts on areas where humans directly 
interact with members of other species, such as on “factory farms”, in labo-
ratory experiments, in circuses, and so on.
Less often discussed is the topic of animal suffering in the wild, even 
in the academic literature, though there have been notable exceptions (for 
instance Sapontzis 1984; Naess 1991; Ng 1995; Kirkwood and Sainsbury 
1996; Cowen 2003; Fink 2005; Clarke and Ng 2006; Nussbaum 2006; 
McMahan 2010; Sözmen 2013). However, the numbers of wild animals on 
which humans have an impact is simply too large for animal advocates to 
ignore. Intense suffering is a regular feature of life in the wild that demands, 
perhaps not quick-fix intervention, but at least long-term research into the 
welfare of wild animals and technologies that might one day allow humans 
to improve it.
The argument developed in this paper will unfold as follows. Section 2 
describes some of the ways in which animals suffer in nature. Section 3 
explains that the majority of animals are small ones whose lives are very 
short and who reproduce by having huge numbers of offspring. Section 4 
argues that due to this most animals probably have lives containing more 
suffering than happiness. Section 5 addresses the question of the extent 
to which young animals are sentient, and presents evidence that many of 
them are already conscious when they emerge from their eggs. Section 6 
examines the question of whether we may intuitively misjudge the degree 
to which animals suffer in nature. Section 7 presents arguments against the 
view that the lives of wild animals must be on balance positive because 
otherwise animals in nature would kill themselves. Section 8 examines and 
rejects the view that humans cannot be successful in reducing the harms 
animals suffer in nature, and section 9 points out that humans already are 
intervening in nature, so our aim should be to do so in ways that are benefi-
cial, instead of harmful, for other animals. Section 10 explains that in light 
of all this, wild-animal suffering is a serious issue, but given the complexi-
ties of the problem, we need more research on how to reduce wild-animal 
suffering. Section 11 argues that future technology will make successful 
intervention in nature easier, even though there are reasons why faster tech-
nological progress may not be desirable in general. Section 12 points out 
that we should focus on avoiding the spread of natural suffering to other 
places where it does not yet exist. Finally, section 13 concludes by arguing 
that animal advocates should focus their efforts to promote concern about 
wild-animal suffering among activists, academics, and others who would be 
sympathetic – both to encourage development of the research field and to 
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ensure that our descendants use their advanced technologies in ways that 
alleviate wild-animal suffering rather than inadvertently multiply it.
2. how wild animalS SuffeR
The scale of animal suffering at human hands is vast, and animal advocates 
are right to be appalled by its magnitude. However, the numbers of animals 
that live in the wild are staggeringly larger (Tomasik [2009] 2014). And, 
like their domestic counterparts, animals in the wild have rich emotional 
lives (Bekoff 2000; Balcombe 2006). Unfortunately, many of these emotions 
are intensely painful. And while “Nature, red in tooth and claw” is widely 
known as a platitude, its visceral meaning can often be overlooked. Below 
are some details of different ways in which wild-animal suffering occurs.
2.1. Predation
When people imagine suffering in nature, perhaps the first image that 
comes to mind is that of a lioness hunting her prey. Christopher McGowan 
(1997, 12-3), for instance, vividly describes the death of a zebra:
The lioness sinks her scimitar talons into the zebra’s rump. They rip through 
the tough hide and anchor deep into the muscle. The startled animal lets out 
a loud bellow as its body hits the ground. An instant later the lioness releases 
her claws from its buttocks and sinks her teeth into the zebra’s throat, chok-
ing off the sound of terror. Her canine teeth are long and sharp, but an animal 
as large as a zebra has a massive neck, with a thick layer of muscle beneath 
the skin, so although the teeth puncture the hide they are too short to reach 
any major blood vessels. She must therefore kill the zebra by asphyxiation, 
clamping her powerful jaws around its trachea (windpipe), cutting off the air 
to its lungs. It is a slow death. If this had been a small animal, say a Thom-
son’s gazelle (Gazella thomsoni) the size of a large dog, she would have bitten 
it through the nape of the neck; her canine teeth would then have probably 
crushed the vertebrae or the base of the skull, causing instant death. As it is, 
the zebra’s death throes will last five or six minutes. 
Some predators kill rather quickly, such as constrictor snakes that cut off 
their victims’ air flow and induce unconsciousness within a minute or two, 
while others impose a more protracted death, such as hyenas that tear off 
chunks of ungulate flesh one bite at a time (Kruuk 1972). Wild dogs dis-
embowel their prey, venomous snakes cause internal bleeding and paralysis 
over the course of several minutes, and crocodiles drown large animals in 
their jaws (McGowan 1997, 22, 43 and 49).
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One snake owner’s guide explains that when rodents are fed to snakes 
they spend some time biting, kicking, scratching, and doing anything they 
can to survive (Flank 1997). Snake prey may not die immediately after 
being swallowed, as is illustrated by the fact that some poisonous newts, 
after ingestion by a snake, excrete toxins to kill their captor so that they can 
crawl back out of its mouth (McGowan 1997, 59).
Prey suffer even in the claws of animals that are often considered cute 
and innocent. For instance, domesticated cats kill in painful ways hundreds of 
millions to billions of rabbits, mice, and birds (Woods et al. 2003; Loss 2013).
Fear of predators produces not only immediate distress, but it may 
also cause long-term psychological trauma. In one study of anxiolytics, 
researchers exposed mice to a cat for five minutes and observed sub-
sequent reactions. They found “that this animal model of exposure of 
mice to unavoidable predatory stimuli produces early cognitive changes 
analogous to those seen in patients with acute stress disorder (ASD)” 
(El Hage et al. 2004, 123). A follow-up study found long-term impacts on 
the mice’s brains: “[…] predatory exposure induced significant learning 
disabilities in the radial maze (16 to 22 days poststressor) and in the spa-
tial configuration of objects recognition test (26 to 28 days poststressor). 
These findings indicate that memory impairments may persist for 
extended periods beyond a predatory stress” (El Hage et al. 2006, 45). 
Similarly, Phillip R. Zoladz (2008) exposed rats to unavoidable predators 
and other anxiety-causing conditions. The result was alterations in bodily 
and behavioral variables resembling human cases of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).
Even for those prey that have not had a traumatic run-in with a preda-
tor, the “landscape of fear” (Laundré et al. 2001) that predators create can 
be distressing. When wolves enter an ecosystem, elk become increasingly 
vigilant against attack (Wirsing and Ripple 2010).
One can advance some argument that evolution should avoid making 
animal lives excessively horrifying for extended periods prior to death 
because doing so might, at least in more complex species, induce PTSD, 
depression, or other debilitating side-effects. Of course, we see empiri-
cally that evolution does induce such disorders when traumatic incidents 
happen, like exposure to a predator. But there is probably some kind of 
reasonable bound on how bad these can be most of the time if animals 
are to remain functional. Death itself is a different matter because, once it 
reaches the point of inevitability, evolutionary pressures do not constrain 
the emotional experience. Death can be as good as painless (for a few lucky 
animals) or as bad as torture (for many others). Evolution has no reason to 
prevent death from feeling unbearably awful (Dawkins 1995).
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2.2. Death by other means
Of course, predation is not the only way in which organisms die painfully. 
Animals are also stricken by diseases and parasites, which may induce 
listlessness, shivering, ulcers, pneumonia, starvation, violent behavior, or 
other gruesome symptoms over the course of days or weeks leading up to 
death. Avian salmonellosis is just one example. Animals infected by this 
disease may develop depression over 1 to 3 days, along with
fluffed-up feathers, unsteadiness, shivering, loss of appetite, markedly 
increased or absence of thirst, rapid loss of weight, accelerated respiration 
and watery yellow, green or blood-tinged droppings. The vent feathers 
become matted with excreta, the eyes begin to close and, immediately before 
death, some birds show apparent blindness, incoordination, staggering, 
tremors, convulsions or other nervous signs. (Michigan Department of Natu-
ral Resources 2015)
Still other animals die of accidents, dehydration during a summer drought, 
or lack of food during the winter. Even weather events can be fatal for 
many animals. For example, if birds can’t find shelter during an ice storm, 
their feet may become frozen to the branch on which they’re perching. 
Some birds become buried in snow and suffocate (Heidorn [1998] 2001).
2.3. A hard life
While death may often constitute the peak of suffering during an animal’s 
life, day-to-day existence is not necessarily pleasant either. Unlike most 
humans in the industrialized world, wild animals do not have immediate 
access to food whenever they become hungry. They must constantly seek out 
water and shelter while remaining on the lookout for predators. Unlike us, 
most animals cannot go inside when it rains or turn on the heat when winter 
temperatures drop far below their usual levels. UCLA (2015) explains:
It is often assumed that wild animals live in a kind of natural paradise and 
that it is only the appearance and intervention of human agencies that bring 
about suffering. This essentially Rousseauian view is at odds with the wealth 
of information derived from field studies of animal populations. Scarcity of 
food and water, predation, disease and intraspecific aggression are some of 
the factors that are normal parts of a wild environment which cause suffering 
in wild animals on a regular basis. While many animals appear to endure 
such conditions rather calmly, this doesn’t necessarily mean they aren’t suf-
fering [Bourne et al. 2005]. Sick and injured members of a prey species are 
the easiest to catch, so predators deliberately target these individuals. As a 
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consequence, those prey that appear sick or injured will be the ones killed 
most often. Thus, evolutionary pressure pushes prey species to avoid draw-
ing attention to their suffering. (Nuffield 2005, chap. 4.12, 66)
In line with this, based on studies of stress-hormone levels in domestic and 
wild animals, Christie Wilcox (2011) concluded the following:
[T]he real question becomes whether a domesticated or captive animal is 
more, less, or as happy in the moment as its wild counterpart. There are a 
few key conditions that are classically thought to lead to a “happy” animal 
by reducing undue stress. These are the basis for most animal cruelty regula-
tions, including those in the US and UK. They include that animals have the 
“rights” to:
- Enough food and water
- Comfortable conditions (temperature, etc.)
- Expression of normal behavior
When it comes to wild animals, though, only the last is guaranteed. They 
have to struggle to survive on a daily basis, from finding food and water to 
another individual to mate with. They do not have the right to comfort, sta-
bility, or good health. […] By the standards our governments have set, the 
life of a wild animal is cruelty.
In conclusion, even if we set aside the pain of their deaths, the lives of wild 
animals contain many other sources of suffering.
3. ShoRt lifeSpanS
In nature, the most populous animals are probably the ones that are gener-
ally worst off. Small mammals and birds have adult lifespans of at most one 
or three years before they face a painful death. And many insects count 
their time on Earth in weeks rather than years – for instance, just 2-4 weeks 
for the horn fly (Cumming [1998] 2006). There are reasons to think that it 
would be better not to exist than to find oneself born as an insect, strug-
gle to navigate the world for a few weeks, and then die of dehydration or 
be caught in a spider’s web. Worse still might be being entangled in an 
Amazonian-ant “torture rack” trap for 12 hours (BBC 2005) or being eaten 
alive over the course of weeks by an Ichneumon wasp (Gould 1994, 32-44). 
(That said, whether caterpillars eaten by Ichneumon wasps feel pain during 
the experience is unclear.)
The question remains unsettled as to whether insects experience con-
scious suffering (Smith 1991). However, the existence of serious debate on 
the issue suggests that we should not rule out the possibility. And seeing as 
insects number 10 to the 18 power (i.e., 18 goes in superindex) (Williams 
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1964), with the number of copepods in the ocean of a similar magnitude 
(Schubel and Butman 1998), the mathematical “expected value” (prob-
ability times amount) of their suffering is vast, even though the force of 
this point would be lessened if, as may be the case, an animal’s “intensity” 
or “degree” of emotional experience depends to some rough extent on the 
size of its brain.
4. why SuffeRing pRobably dominateS happineSS
In light of what we have seen above, there are strong reasons in favor of the 
view that most animals (except maybe those that live a long time) probably 
have lives not worth living. Wild animals endure cold, hunger, disease, fear 
of predators, and other stresses on a regular basis. Moreover, even if ani-
mals enjoy net happiness during most of their lives, this may be outweighed 
by the painful intensity of their deaths. The claim of net expected suffering 
in nature appears to need only a weaker assertion: namely, that almost all of 
the expected happiness and suffering in nature come from animals that live 
very short lives. This is because most of the animals that live in nature are 
small (e.g., minnows and insects). The adults of these species live at most a 
few years, often just a few months or weeks, so it is hard in these cases for 
the happiness of life to outweigh the pain of death. Moreover, almost all 
the babies of these species die (possibly painfully) after just a few days or 
weeks of being born. This reproductive strategy of birthing many offspring 
with short lives has traditionally been called “r-selection”.
Humans are not r-selected, since they can only produce one child 
per reproductive season (excepting twins and other unusual cases). By 
contrast, in one reproductive season, dogs (Canis familiaris) may produce 
1-22 offspring, the starling (Sturmus vulgaris) may lay 4-6 eggs, the bullfrog 
(Rana catesbeiana) may lay 6,000-20,000 eggs, and the scallop (Argopecten 
irradians) may lay 2 million eggs. Most small animals like minnows and 
insects are r-strategists. Granted, it is unclear whether all of these species 
are sentient – and even more regarding that fraction of the eggs that fails 
to hatch (see the next section) – but again, in expected-value terms, the 
amount of expected suffering is enormous.
Prevalent reproductive strategies thus mean that the number of animal 
deaths per parent is often high. Hapgood (1979, 34) explains how this hap-
pens:
All species reproduce in excess, way past the carrying capacity of their niche. 
In her lifetime a lioness might have 20 cubs; a pigeon, 150 chicks; a mouse, 
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1000 kits; a trout, 20,000 fry, a tuna or cod, a million fry or more; […] and 
an oyster, perhaps a hundred million spat. If one assumes that the popula-
tion of each of these species is, from generation to generation, roughly equal, 
then on average only one offspring will survive to replace each parent. All 
the other thousands and millions will die, one way or another. 
If we consider this together with the claim made above that the lives of the 
animals who die shortly after starting to exist include more suffering than 
positive well-being, we can reach the conclusion that suffering prevails over 
happiness in nature.
The strategy of “making lots of copies and hoping a few come out” 
may be perfectly sensible from the standpoint of evolution, but the cost to 
the individual organisms is tremendous. Matthew Clarke and Yew-Kwang 
Ng (2006, section 4) conclude from an analysis of the welfare implications 
of population dynamics that “The number of offspring of a species that 
maximizes fitness may lead to suffering and is different from the number 
that maximizes welfare (average or total)”. And Ng (1995, 272) concludes 
from the excess of offspring over adult survivors: “Under the assumptions 
of concave and symmetrical functions relating costs to enjoyment and suf-
fering, evolutionary economizing results in the excess of total suffering 
over total enjoyment”.
5. when do babieS become Sentient?
The previous section explained that in r-selected species, parents may have 
hundreds or even tens of thousands of offspring, and almost all of these die 
shortly after birth. It also argued that this causes net suffering to prevail 
in nature. But in order to reach that conclusion, some questions remain. 
What fraction of these offspring are sentient at the time of death, and what 
fraction merely die as unconscious eggs or larvae? 
According to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA 2005, 37-42) 
the age at which fetuses of various species begin to feel conscious pain 
varies depending on whether a species is precocial (well developed at birth, 
such as horses) or altricial (still developing at birth, such as marsupials). 
Precocial animals are more likely to feel pain at earlier ages. Also relevant 
is whether the species is viviparous (having live birth) or oviparous (giving 
birth through eggs). Viviparous animals have greater need to inhibit fetal 
consciousness during development in order to prevent injury to the mother 
and siblings. Oviparous animals that are constrained by shells have less 
need for inhibition of awareness before birth. In precocial birds, neural 
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development takes place when several days remain before hatching, and 
controlled movements as well as responses to stimuli occur then (Broom 
1981). The European Food Safety (EFSA 2005, 38) also points out:
Most amphibians and fish have larval forms which are not well developed at 
hatching but develop rapidly with experience of independent life[.] Those 
fish and amphibians that are well developed at hatching or viviparous birth 
and all cephalopods, since these are small but well developed at hatching, 
will have had a functioning nervous system and the potential for awareness 
for some time before hatching. 
Thus, it seems that many animals are able to suffer around the time of birth 
if not before.
Another consideration suggestive of pain before birth is the fact that many 
oviparous vertebrates can hatch early in response to environmental stimuli, 
including vibrations that feel like a predator. Early hatching has also been 
documented for amphibians, fish, and invertebrates (Doody and Paull 2013).
These points suggest that a nontrivial fraction of the large numbers of 
offspring born to r-selected species may very well be conscious during the 
pain of their deaths after a few short days, or even hours, of life. This means 
that the above conclusion regarding the prevalence of suffering stands.
6. miSjudging levelS of well-being?
Another objection that can be considered here is that there is a danger in 
extrapolating the welfare of wild animals from our own imagination of how 
we would feel in the situation. We can imagine immense discomfort were 
we to sleep through a cold winter night’s storm with only a sweatshirt to 
keep us warm, but many animals have better fur coats and can often find 
some sort of shelter. More generally, it seems unlikely that species would 
gain an adaptive advantage by feeling constant hardship, since stress does 
entail a metabolic cost (Ng 1995). Also, r-selected animals might suffer 
less from a given injury than long-lived animals would because r-selected 
creatures have less to lose by taking big short-term risks (Tomasik [2013] 
2015).
On the other hand, we should also be wary of underestimating the 
extent and severity of wild-animal suffering due to our own biases. You, 
the reader, are probably in the comfort of a climate-controlled building 
or vehicle, with a relatively full stomach, and without fear of attack. Many 
of us go through life in a relatively euthymic state, and it is easy to assume 
that the general pleasantness with which life greets us is shared by most 
Brian Tomasik
142
Relations – 3.2 - November 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
other people and animals. When we think about nature, we may picture 
chirping songbirds or frolicking gazelles, rather than deer having their 
flesh chewed off while conscious or immobilized raccoons afflicted by 
roundworms. Moreover, even these examples, insofar as they involve large 
land animals, reflect a human tendency toward the “availability heuristic”. 
In fact, the most prevalent wild animals of all are small organisms, many 
ocean-dwelling. When we think “wild animals”, we should (if we adopt 
the expected-value approach to uncertainty about sentience) picture ants, 
copepods, and tiny fish, rather than lions or gazelles.
People may not accurately assess at a single instant how they’ll feel 
overall during a longer period of time (Kahneman and Sugden 2005). They 
often exhibit “rosy prospection” toward future events and “rosy retrospec-
tion” about the past, in which they assume that their previous and future 
levels of well-being were and will be better than what’s reported at the time 
of the experiences (Mitchell and Thompson 1994). Moreover, even when 
organisms do correctly judge their hedonic levels, they often show a “will 
to live” quite apart from pleasure or pain. Animals that, in the face of lives 
genuinely not worth living, decide to end their existence tend not to repro-
duce very successfully.
Ultimately, though, regardless of exactly how good or bad we assess 
life in the wild to be on balance, it remains undeniable that many animals in 
nature endure some dreadful experiences.
7. if life in natuRe iS So bad, why don’t wild animalS
 kill themSelveS?
One objection against the idea that most animals endure more suffering 
than positive well-being would point out that if that were so, then most 
animals would have reason to kill themselves – something they appear not 
to do. There are several responses against this objection.
Most animals do not understand suicide – It may be that most animals 
(except the smartest mammals and birds?), while conscious emotionally, 
do not understand death. As an analogy, when we have nightmares, we feel 
bad, but we do not fully realize we are dreaming and are not sufficiently in 
control of the situation that we can end the nightmares at will. It is reason-
able to think that non-dreaming animals do have more control over their 
physical states than we do when asleep, but the broader point is that an 
animal can have emotions without understanding life and death.
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Little to be gained when most suffering comes from death anyway – Animals 
do not generally have painless ways to kill themselves, and most of the total 
pain of their short lives may come from dying. For example, many of the 
1000 offspring of a beetle mother will die within a few days or weeks of 
hatching. Their lives up to the point of death might hover around being 
neutral between pain and happiness, so there is not much to be gained by 
early suicide.
Temporal discounting – An animal often fails to act in its long-term hedonic 
interest due to short-sightedness. Even if suicide were optimal, the animal 
might not kill itself because doing so would be painful in the short run.
Non-hedonic “will to live” – Animals appear to have a “will to live” that 
is partly separate from their hedonic well-being. Animal behaviors are 
integrations of huge numbers of signals and brain systems, so it is not 
surprising that some of these systems act contrary to the hedonic-welfare-
maximization systems. If animals did not have a “will to live”, presumably 
they would not survive as effectively.
Few suicides on factory farms – Perhaps animals such as battery-cage hens 
would be better off killing themselves. So, if animals do kill themselves 
when their lives are not worth living, why do not we see more suicides on 
factory farms? 
Big animals may have decent lives – Finally, we must note that the animals 
that potentially could contemplate suicide (such as, maybe, chimpanzees?) 
likely do have lives worth living a good amount of the time. Those animals 
who do not, which are the majority, are those who cannot conceive the idea 
of taking their own lives to stop suffering.
8. aRe humanS helpleSS to aid?
Why, then, is the suffering of wild animals not a top priority for animal 
advocates? One reason is philosophical. Some feel that while humans have 
duties to treat well the animals that they use or live with, they have no 
responsibility to those outside their sphere of interaction (Palmer 2010). 
This response is, however, unsatisfying. If we really care about animals 
because we do not want fellow organisms to suffer brutally – not just 
because we want to “keep our moral house clean” – then it should not 
matter whether we have a personal connection with wild animals or not.
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Other philosophers agree with this but do not oppose human inaction 
because they think that humans are ultimately helpless to change the situa-
tion. When asked whether we should stop lions from eating gazelles, Peter 
Singer (1973) replied:
[F]or practical purposes I am fairly sure, judging from man’s past record of 
attempts to mold nature to his own aims, that we would be more likely to 
increase the net amount of animal suffering if we interfered with wildlife, 
than to decrease it. Lions play a role in the ecology of their habitat, and we 
cannot be sure what the long-term consequences would be if we were to 
prevent them from killing gazelles. […] So, in practice, I would definitely say 
that wildlife should be left alone. 
I would point out in response to Singer that most human interventions 
have not been designed to improve wild-animal welfare, and even so, many 
of them probably have decreased wild-animal suffering on balance by 
reducing habitats.
In a similar vein as Singer, Jennifer Everett (2001, 48) suggested that 
consequentialists may endorse evolutionary selection because it eliminates 
deleterious genetic traits:
[I]f propagation of the “fittest” genes contributes to the integrity of both 
predator and prey species, which is good for the predator/prey balance in 
the ecosystem, which in turn is good for the organisms living in it, and so on, 
then the very ecological relationships that holistic environmentalists regard 
as intrinsically valuable will be valued by animal welfarists because they 
conduce ultimately, albeit indirectly and via complex causal chains, to the 
well-being of individual animals. 
These authors are right that consideration of long-range ecological side-
effects is important. However, it does not follow that humans have no 
obligations regarding wild animals or that animal supporters should remain 
silent about nature’s cruelty. The next few sections elaborate on ways in 
which humans can indeed do something about wild-animal suffering.
9. humanS alReady impact natuRe
We should be cautious about quick-fix intervention. Ecology is extremely 
complicated, and humans have a long track record of underestimating 
the number of unanticipated consequences they will encounter in trying 
to engineer improvements to nature. On the other hand, there are many 
instances in which we are already interfering with wildlife in some manner. 
As Tyler Cowen (2003, 10) has observed: 
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In other cases we are interfering with nature, whether we like it or not. It is 
not a question of uncertainty holding us back from policing, but rather how 
to compare one form of policing to another. Humans change water levels, 
fertilize particular soils, influence climatic conditions, and do many other 
things that affect the balance of power in nature. These human activities will 
not go away any time soon, but in the meantime we need to evaluate their 
effects on carnivores and their victims.
One such evaluation was actually carried out regarding an Australian 
government decision to cull overpopulated and starving kangaroos at an 
Australian Defense Force army base (Clarke and Ng 2006). While admit-
tedly crude and theoretical, the analysis proves that the tools of welfare 
economics can be combined with the principles of population ecology to 
reach nontrivial conclusions about how human interference with wildlife 
affects aggregate animal well-being.
Consider another example. Humans spray 3 billion tons of pesticides 
per year (Pimentel 2009), and whether or not we think this causes more 
wild-animal suffering than it prevents, large-scale insecticide use is, to some 
extent, a fait accompli of modern society. If, hypothetically, scientists could 
develop ways to make these chemicals act more quickly or less painfully, 
enormous numbers of insects and larger organisms could be given slightly 
less agonizing deaths  1.
Human changes to the environment – through agriculture, urbaniza-
tion, deforestation, pollution, climate change, and so on – have huge 
consequences, both negative and positive, for wild animals. For instance, 
“paving paradise [or, rather, hell?] to put up a parking lot” prevents the 
existence of animals that would otherwise have lived there. Even where 
habitats are not destroyed, humans may change the composition of species 
living in them. If, say, an invasive species has a shorter lifespan and more 
non-surviving offspring than the native counterpart, the result would be 
more total suffering. Of course, the opposite could just as easily be the 
case.
Caring about wild-animal suffering should not be mistaken as general 
support for environmental preservation; indeed, in some or even many 
cases, preventing existence may be the most humane option. Consequen-
tialist vegetarians ought not find this line of reasoning unusual: 
The utilitarian argument against factory farming is precisely that, e.g., a 
broiler hen would be better off not existing than suffering in cramped con-
 1 Note that pesticides could actually prevent net insect suffering if they reduce insect 
populations enough, so encouraging humane insecticides is not equivalent to encouraging 
less pesticide use.
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ditions for 45 days before slaughter. Of course, even in the calculation of 
whether to adopt a vegetarian diet, the impacts on animals in the wild can 
be important and sometimes dominant over the direct effects on farmed ani-
mals themselves. (Matheny and Chan 2005)
That said, before we become too enthusiastic about eliminating natural 
ecosystems, we should also remember that many other humans value 
wilderness, and it is good to avoid making enemies or tarnishing the suf-
fering-reduction cause by by pitting it in direct opposition to other things 
people care about. In addition, many forms of environmental preservation, 
especially reducing climate change, may be important to the far future, by 
improving prospects for compromise among the major world powers that 
develop artificial general intelligence.
10. a ReSeaRch agenda
In light of what we have seen above, wild-animal suffering deserves a seri-
ous research program, devoted to questions like the following:
 (i) What animals are sentient? What reasonable subjective probabilities 
should we use for the sentience of reptiles, amphibians, fish, and various 
invertebrates?
 (ii) What sorts of affective states do animals experience during the course of 
everyday life in the wild? How often do they feel hunger, cold, fear, hap-
piness, satisfaction, boredom, and intense agony, and to what degrees? 
In the future, perhaps it will become possible to answer this question 
with high precision through wearable continuous measurement devices 
recording neural correlates of hedonic experience. But until then, we 
can also benefit greatly by applying standard tools for assessing animal 
welfare (Broom 1991). 
 (iii) What is the overall balance of happiness versus suffering for various spe-
cies? How does this depend on the animal’s lifespan and whether it dies 
before maturity? 
 (iv) Are certain species happier than others? Do certain types of ecosystems 
contain less total suffering than others? Which environmental-preserva-
tion efforts increase and which decrease aggregate animal welfare? Are 
there long-term technologies that could eventually enable humans suc-
cessfully to reduce wild-animal suffering in a serious way?
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11. advanced technologieS?
Humans presently lack the knowledge and technical ability to seriously 
“solve” the problem of wild-animal suffering without potentially disastrous 
consequences. However, this may not be the case in the future, as people 
develop a deeper understanding of ecology and welfare assessment.
If sentience is not rare in the universe, then the problem of wild-animal 
suffering extends beyond our planet. If it is improbable that life will evolve 
the type of intelligence that humans have, we might expect that most of 
the extraterrestrials in existence are at the level of the smallest, shortest-
lived creatures on Earth. Thus, if humans ever do send robotic probes into 
space, there might be great benefit in using them to help wild animals on 
other planets. (One hopes that objections by deep ecologists to intervening 
in extraterrestrial ecosystems would be overcome.)
However, I should note that faster technological progress in general 
is not necessarily desirable. Especially in fields like artificial intelligence 
and neuroscience, faster progress may accelerate risks of suffering of other 
kinds. As a general heuristic, it may be better to wait on developing tech-
nologies that unleash vast amounts of new power before humans have the 
social institutions and wisdom to constrain misuse of this power.
12. inadveRtently multiplying SuffeRing
While advanced future technologies could offer promise for helping wild 
animals, they also carry risks of multiplying the cruelty of the natural world. 
For instance, it is conceivable that humans could one day spread Earth-like 
environmental conditions to Mars in the process of “terraforming” (Burton 
2004). More speculatively, others have proposed “directed panspermia”: 
dispatching probes into the galaxy to seed other planets with biological 
material (Meot-Ner and Matloff 1979). Post-human computer simulations 
may become sufficiently accurate that the wild-animal life they contain 
would consciously suffer. Already we see many simulation models of 
natural selection, and it is just a matter of time before these are augmented 
with AI capabilities such that the organisms involved become sentient and 
literally feel the pain of being injured and killed. Any of these possibili-
ties would have prodigious ethical implications, and I do hope that before 
undertaking them, future humans consider seriously the consequences of 
such actions for the creatures involved.
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13. activiStS Should focuS on outReach
What does all of this imply for the animal-advocacy movement? There are 
reasons to think the best first step toward reducing wild-animal suffering 
that we can take now is to promote general concern for the issue. Caus-
ing more people to think and care about wild-animal suffering will hasten 
developments in research on wild-animal welfare and associated humane 
technologies, while at the same time helping to ensure that our advanced 
descendants think cautiously about actions that would create vastly more 
suffering organisms.
Perhaps finding supporters within the animal-advocacy community 
would be a good starting point. While some activists oppose all human 
intervention with the affairs of animals, occasionally even preferring that 
humans did not exist, many people who feel humane sympathy for the suf-
fering of members of other species should welcome efforts to prevent cru-
elty in the wild. It’s important to ensure that the animal-rights movement 
doesn’t end up increasing support for wilderness preservation and human 
non-interference of all kinds. Another potential source of supporters could 
be people interested in evolution, who recognize what Richard Dawkins 
(1995, 133) has called the “blind, pitiless indifference” of natural selection.
Individuals can do much to raise the issue on their own, such as by 
(i)  posting on animal-rights forums and writing blog comments, (ii) par-
ticipating in animal-rights meetups/events and asking attendees what they 
think, and (iii) writing conference papers, journal articles, or books on the 
topic (perhaps co-authored with ecologists, ethologists, or other scientists, 
to ensure that the work is not entirely armchair philosophy).
There may be a danger here of raising the wild-animal issue before 
the general public is ready. Indeed, the cruelty of nature is often used as 
a reductio by meat-eaters against consequentialist vegetarianism. Sug-
gesting that ethical consideration for animals could require us to expend 
resources toward long-term research aimed at helping wildlife might turn 
off entirely people who would otherwise have given some consideration 
to at least those animals that they affect through dietary choices (Greger 
2005). So wild-animal outreach should begin within communities that are 
most receptive, such as philosophers, animal activists, transhumanists, and 
scientists. We can plant the seeds of the idea so that it can grow into a 
component of the animal-rights movement. A “do not spread wild-animal 
suffering to space” message could even appear even in venues like TED or 
Slate precisely because it is a controversial idea that people have not heard 
before. For those audiences, the message wouldn’t interfere with audience 
members’ daily lives and therefore could be entertained with less resistance.
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It is crucial that at some point the animal-rights movement moves 
beyond farm, laboratory, and companion animals. The scale of brutality 
in nature is too vast to ignore, and humans have an obligation to exercise 
their cosmically rare position as both intelligent and empathetic creatures 
to reduce suffering in the wild as much as they can.
RefeRenceS
Balcombe, Jonathan. 2006. Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature of Feeling 
Good. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
BBC. 2005. “Fierce Ants Build ‘Torture Rack’”. BBC News, April 23. http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4472521.stm.
Bekoff, Marc, ed. 2000. The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal Emo-
tions. New York: Random House - Discovery Books.
Bourne, Debra C., Penny Cusdin, and Suzanne I. Boardman, eds. 2005. “Pain Man-
agement in Ruminants”. Wildlife Information Network. https://web.archive.
org/web/20060821123033/http://www.wildlifeinformation.org/About/Vol_
PainManagement.htm.
Broom, D.M. 1981. “Behavioural Plasticity in Developing Animals”. In Development 
in the Nervous System (British Society for Developmental Biology Symposia), 
edited by D.R. Garrod and J.D. Feldman, 361-78. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
 1991. “Animal Welfare: Concepts and Measurement”. Journal of Animal Sci-
ence 69 (10): 4167-75.
Burton, Kathleen. 2004. “NASA Presents Star-Studded Mars Debate”. NASA, March 
25. http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/news/releases/2004/04_22AR.html.
Clarke, Matthew, and Yew-Kwang Ng. 2006. “Population Dynamics and Animal Wel-
fare: Issues Raised by the Culling of Kangaroos in Puckapunyal”. Social Choice 
and Welfare 27 (2): 407-22.
Cowen, Tyler. 2003. “Policing Nature”. Environmental Ethics 25 (2): 169-82. 
Cumming, Jeffrey M. (1998) 2006. “Horn Fly ‘Haematobia irritans (L.)’”. North 
American Dipterists Society (NADS). Diptera Associated with Livestock Dung. 
http://www.nadsdiptera.org/FFP/horn.htm. 
Dawkins, Richard. 1995. River Out of Eden. New York: Basic Books. 
Doody, J. Sean, and Phillip Paull. 2013. “Hitting the Ground Running: Environmen-
tally Cued Hatching in a Lizard”. Copeia 1: 160-5.
El Hage, Wissam, Guy Griebel, and Catherine Belzung. 2006. “Long-Term Impaired 
Memory Following Predatory Stress in Mice”. Physiology and Behavior 87: 
45-50.
El Hage, Wissam, Sylvie Peronny, Guy Griebel, and Catherine Belzung. 2004. “Impaired 
Memory Following Predatory Stress in Mice Is Improved by Fluoxetine”. Pro-
gress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry 28: 123-8.
Brian Tomasik
150
Relations – 3.2 - November 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) - Animal and Welfare Scientific (ANAHAW) 
Panel. 2005. “Aspects of the Biology and Welfare of Animals Used for Experi-
mental and Other Scientific Purposes”. EFSA Journal 292: 1-136.
Everett, Jennifer. 2001. “Environmental Ethics, Animal Welfarism, and the Problem 
of Predation: a Bambi Lover’s Respect for Nature”. Ethics and the Environ-
ment 6 (1): 42-67.
Flank, Lenny. 1997. The Snake: an Owner’s Guide to a Happy Healthy Pet. New York: 
Howell Book House.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1994. “Nonmoral Nature”. In Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes: Fur-
ther Reflections in Natural History, edited by Stephen Jay Gould, 32-44. New 
York: W.W. Norton.
Greger, Michael. 2005. “Why Honey Is Vegan”. Satya, September. http://www.satyamag.
com/sept05/greger.html.
Hapgood, Fred. 1979. Why Males Exist: an Inquiry into the Evolution of Sex. New 
York: Morrow.
Heidorn, Keith C. (1998) 2001. “Ice Storms: Hazardous Beauty”. The Weather Doctor. 
http://www.islandnet.com/~see/weather/elements/icestorm.htm.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Robert Sugden. 2005. “Experienced Utility as a Standard of 
Policy Evaluation”. Environmental and Resource Economics 32: 161-81.
Kirkwood, James K., and Anthony W. Sainsbury. 1996. “Ethics of Interventions for 
the Welfare of Free-Living Wild Animals”. Animal Welfare 5: 235-43.
Kruuk, H. 1972. The Spotted Hyena. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laundré, John W., Lucina Hernández, and Kelly B. Altendorf. 2001. “Wolves, Elk, 
and Bison: Reestablishing the ‘Landscape of Fear’ in Yellowstone National 
Park, U.S.A.”. Canadian Journal of Zoology 79: 1401-9.
Loss, Scott R., Tom Will, and Peter P. Marra. 2013. “The Impact of Free-Ranging 
Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the United States”. Nature Communications 4 
(1396). http://www.accord3.com/docs/Loss%20et%20al%202013%20Impact
 %20of%20free%20ranging%20domestic%20cats%20on%20wildlife%20
in%20U.pdf.
Matheny, Gaverick, and Kai M.A. Chan. 2005. “Human Diets and Animal Welfare: 
the Illogic of the Larder”. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 18 
(6): 579-94.
McGowan, Christopher. 1997. The Raptor and the Lamb: Predators and Prey in the 
Living World. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
McMahan, Jeff. 2010. “The Meat Eaters”. The New York Times, September 19. http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/the-meat-eaters/. 
Meot-Ner, Michael, and Gregory L. Matloff. 1979. “Directed Panspermia: a Technical 
and Ethical Evaluation of Seeding the Universe”. Journal of the British Interplan-
etary Society 32: 419-23. http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1979JBIS...32..419M.
Michigan Department of Natural Resources. 2015. “Salmonellosis”. Michigan Wildlife 
Disease Manual. http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,1607,7-153-10370_12150_
 12220-27268--,00.html.
The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering
151
Relations – 3.2 - November 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
Mill, John Stuart. (1874) 2005. Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism. Elibron 
Classics.
Mitchell, Terence, and Leigh Thompson. 1994. “A Theory of Temporal Adjustments 
of the Evaluation of Events: Rosy Prospection and Rosy Retrospection”. In 
Advances in Managerial Cognition and Organizational Information-Processing, 
5, edited by C. Stubbart, J. Porac, and J. Meindl, 85-114. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Ng, Yew-Kwang. 1995. “Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of 
Animal Consciousness and Suffering”. Biology and Philosophy 10 (3): 255-85.
Nuffield. 2005. Ethics of Research Involving Animals. London: Nuffield Council on Bio-
ethics. http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/The-ethics-of-research-
involving-animals-full-report.pdf. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Mem-
bership. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Palmer, Clare. 2010. Animal Ethics in Context. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Pimentel, David. 2009. “Pesticides and Pest Control”. In Integrated Pest Management: 
Innovation-Development Process, edited by Rajinder Peshin and Ashok K. 
Dhawan, 83-7. Dordrecht: Springer.
Sallinger, Bob. 2003. “Audubon Society Favors Keeping Cats Indoors”. The Oregonian, 
November 17. https://web.archive.org/web/20031129025110/http://www.
oregonlive.com/public_commentary/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/editorial/
 106890137150090.xml.
Sapontzis, Steve F. 1984. “Predation”. Ethics and Animals 5 (2): 27-38.
Schubel, Jerry R., and Cheryl A. Butman. 1998. “Keeping a Finger on the Pulse of 
Marine Biodiversity: How Healthy Is It?”. In Nature and Human Society: the 
Quest for a Sustainable World, edited by Peter H. Raven, 84-103. Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press.
Singer, Peter. 1973. “Food for Thought [Reply to a Letter by David Rosinger]”. New 
York Review of Books 20 (10), June 14. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/1973/jun/14/food-for-thought/.
Smith, Jane A. 1991. “A Question of Pain in Invertebrates”. ILAR Journal 33 (1-2): 
25-31.
Sözmen, Beril I. 2013. “Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffering in Nature”. 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5): 1075-88.
Stam, Rianne. 2007. “PTSD and Stress Sensitisation: a Tale of Brain and Body Part 2: 
Animal Models”. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 31 (4): 558-84.
Tomasik, Brian. (2009) 2014. “How Many Wild Animals Are There?”. Essays on 
Reducing Suffering. http://reducing-suffering.org/how-many-wild-animals-
are-there/.
 (2013) 2015. “Fitness Considerations Regarding the Suffering of Short-Lived 
Animals”. Essays on Reducing Suffering. http://reducing-suffering.org/fitness-
considerations-for-the-suffering-of-short-lived-animals/.
UCLA. 2015. “Captivity and Suffering”. UCLA - Office of Animal Research Oversight 
(OARO). http://ora.research.ucla.edu/OARO/Pages/ethical-considerations/
captivity-and-suffering.aspx.
Brian Tomasik
152
Relations – 3.2 - November 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
Wilcox, Christie. 2011. “Bambi or Bessie: Are Wild Animals Happier?”. Scien-
tific American Blogs, April 12. http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-
blog/2011/04/12/bambi-or-bessie-are-wild-animals-happier/.
Williams, Carrington B. 1964. Patterns in the Balance of Nature and Related Problems. 
London: Academic Press.
Wirsing, Aaron J., and William J. Ripple. 2010. “A Comparison of Shark and Wolf 
Research Reveals Similar Behavioral Responses by Prey”. Frontiers in Ecology 
and the Environment 9 (6): 335-41.
Woods, Michael, Robbie A. McDonald, and Stephen Harris. 2003. “Predation of 
Wildlife by Domestic Cats ‘Felis catus’ in Great Britain”. Mammal Review 33 
(2): 174-88.
Zoladz, Phillip R. 2008. An Ethologically Relevant Animal Model of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder: Physiological, Pharmacological and Behavioral Sequelae in 
Rats Exposed to Predator Stress and Social Instability. Graduate Diss., Uni-
versity of South Florida. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1583&context=etd.
